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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
LEGISLATION**
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
* At the 1981 session of the legislature, five significant pieces of legislation af-
fecting matrimonial regimes law were passed, but only two acts are discussed in this
symposium. The addition of Civil Code article 2369.1 by Act 751, authorizing the judge
to partition in kind community property at termination by allocating assets and
liabilities of "equal net value," is discussed in the student symposium on matrimonial
regimes which appears in this issue at pages 725-820. Senate Concurrent Resolution
No. 165 requests the Senate Committee on Judiciary A and the House Committee on
Civil Law and Procedure to function as a joint committee. The joint committee resolu-
tion proposes a study of the "need for and feasibility of developing a specific procedure
for the partition of community property between spouses, and settlement of debts and
claims for reimbursement upon dissolution of the community regime for any cause." Id.
The joint committee is charged to make a written report of its findings to the
legislature prior to the 1982 Regular Session, "together with any specific proposals
for legislation." Id. Thus, future legislation likely will be proposed to resolve remaining
problems which exist when the community is terminated. Termination of the community
under the matrimonial regimes law is the subject of one of the articles in the student
symposium in this issue, see Note, Termination of the Community, 42 LA. L. REv. at
pages 789-820 and in a student comment to be published here in the future.
Article 2343, involving the transformation of community property to separate prop-
erty of the donee spouse, was amended by Act 921. In addition to classifying the prop-
erty as separate, the article classifies the natural and civil fruits, shut-in payments,
bonuses, and delay rentals produced from this property as separate property of the
donee, without the necessity of the donee's declaration reserving such proceeds as
separate. Civil Code article 2339, which generally classifies fruits and income produced
from separate property as community, was amended approximately six months after it
became effective. 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, § 2. The.original enumeration of payments
"arising from mineral leases" under article 2339 did not include royalties or the pay-
ment of the minerals "in kind" as the equivalent of fruits. By amendment during the
1980 legislative session royalties were added to the enumeration in article 2339, as
well as the following language: "minerals produced from or attributable to a separate
asset ..." Id Thus, from September 12, 1980, royalties and "in kind" minerals produced
from a separate asset were classified as community, unless the spouse whose separate
property was affected filed a declaration reserving the payments as separate. The
classification of royalties and "in kind" mineral payments attributable to separate pro-
perty from January 1, 1980, until September 12, 1980, were separate property without
the necessity of the article 2339 declaration. See a full discussion of this subject in
Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the
1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 110-13 (1979). At the time that arti-
cle 2339 was amended to include royalties and "in kind" payments of minerals, article
2343, the exception to the general rule of article 2339, was overlooked. Arguably, from
September 12, 1980 until September 13, 1981, if royalties or "in kind" minerals were
produced from separate property of a spouse under article 2343, those payments were
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Voluntary Partition -Civil Code Articles 2336 and 2341
With one notable exception,' spouses are generally capable of
contracting with each other by virtue of an amendment to Louisiana
Civil Code article 1790 effective January 1, 1980. Thus, spouses are
free to enter into sales, leases, partnerships -virtually any contract
that could be executed with a stranger. The only exception to the
spouses' general capacity to contract with each other is the
matrimonial agreement which requires judicial approval.'
Because the spouses must have judicial approval of a
matrimonial agreement, a distinction between an agreement
community under article 2339 unless a declaration reserving them as separate was fil-
ed. The general rule of article 2339 applied to those payments, because the exception
of article 2343 included only the enumerated "bonuses, delay rentals and shut-in
payments arising from mineral leases." As of September 13, 1981, however, article
2343 includes in its enumeration, just as article 2339, "royalties" and "minerals produced
from or attributed to the property given."
Another piece of significant 1981 legislation was an amendment to Louisiana Civil
Code article 2348, authorizing a spouse to renounce the right to concur in the aliena-
tion, encumbrance or lease of a community immovable. 1981 La. Acts, No. 132, § 1.
Before the 1981 amendment, the renunciation had to be as to a particular piece of com-
munity immovable property, evidenced by the use of the article "a" in the statutory
language and comment (b to Civil Code article 2348. Under article 2348, as amended, a
spouse may renounce the right to concur in the alienation, encumbrance or lease of
"some or all of the community immovables." Id. (emphasis added). In instances where a
spouse does generally renounce the right to concur in the sale of all community im-
movables, article 2348 permits the spouse to "reserve the right to concur in the aliena-
tion, encumbrance, or lease of specifically described community immovable property."
Amended article 2348 allows a spouse to renounce the right to concur generally, which
is similar in effect to the ability of the wife generally to waive the necessity of her
consent to the sale, mortgage or lease of community immovable property under Civil
Code article 2334 (effective January 1, 1977; repealed January 1, 1980).
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (effective January 1, 1980).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1790 (effective Jananuary 1, 1980):
Besides the general incapacity that persons of certain descriptions are under,
there are others applicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the par-
ties, such as tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other are forbidden; or in
relation to the subject of the contracts, such as purchases, by the administrator,
of any part of the estate committed to his charge. These take place only in the
cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this code.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (effective January 1, 1980):
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage as
to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy.
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a
matrimonial regime during marriage only upon joint petition and a finding by the
court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing
principles and rules. They may, however, subject themselves to the legal regime
by a matrimonial agreement at any time without court approval.
During the first year after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state,
spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement without court approval.
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b6establishing a regime of separation of property or modifying or
terminating the legal regime"' and a contract which has the effect of
changing the classification of property is important. For example,
the spouses may desire to convert community property to separate
property of one of the spouses. A comment to article 2330 suggests
that such a provision could be included in a matrimonial agreement,
since the spouses have flexibility in determining the ownership of
their property subject to certain limitations.' Despite the implica-
tions that a change in the characterization of community property to
separate property is "modifying the legal regime," article 2343 per-
mits this transfer by simple donation.'
Husband and wife are capable of executing a contract of parti-
tion,' just as they have the capacity to execute other ordinary con-
tracts. Although Civil Code article 2336 prohibits a judicial partition
of community property during the existence of a legal regime,8 a
comment to article 2336 recognized the ability of spouses who each
own an undivided one-half interest in community property to parti-
tion amicably the things of the community The resulting classifica-
4. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2328 (effective January 1, 1980):
A matrimonial agreement is a contract establishing a regime of separation of
property or modifying or terminating the legal regime. Spouses are free to
establish by matrimonial agreement a regime of separation of property or modify
the legal regime as provided by law. The provisions of the legal regime that have
not been excluded or modified by agreement retain their force and effect.
5. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2330 comment (d) (effective January 1, 1980):
Article 2330 allows the spouses flexibility to determine the ownership and
management of their property subject to certain limitations. For example, the
spouses may by matrimonial agreement provide for contribution to the expenses
of the marriage, for apportionment of community property according to fixed
shares, or for the reservation of fruits as separate property. The spouses may,
further, determine that their existing or future property shall be subject to the
matrimonial regime. In such a case, a matrimonial agreement may in fact be a
donation governed by the rules of substance and form applicable to donations.
6. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1):
The donation by a spouse to the other spouse of his undivided interest in a
thing forming part of the community transforms that interest into separate prop-
erty of the donee. Unless otherwise provided in the act of donation, an equal in-
terest of the donee is also transformed into separate property and the natural and
civil fruits of the thing, and minerals produced from or attributed to the property
given as well as bonuses, delay rentals, royalties and shut.in payments arising
from mineral leases, form part of the donee's separate property.
7. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1790 (effective January 1, 1980).
8. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336 (effective January 1, 1980):
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community prop-
erty. Nevertheless, neither the community nor things of the community may be
judicially partitioned prior to the termination of the regime.
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336, comment (a) (effective January 1, 1980):
The co-ownership of the community is subject to the rules governing termina-
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tion of the property acquired by voluntary partition of community
property was community under Civil Code article 2338: "all other
property not classified by law as separate property.""IU The omnibus
clause of article 2338 classifying the property acquired by partition
as community" frequently deprived the spouses of the ability to ac-
complish what they desired by the partition. Therefore, amendments
to Louisiana Civil Code articles 2336 and 2341 were recommended
by the Louisiana Law Institute and passed at the 1981 legislative
tion of the regime rather than the general rules of the Civil Code governing
judicial partition. The spouses may amicably partition things of the community,
without prejudice to the rights of third persons. But neither the spouses nor their
creditors may force a judicial partition as long as the regime continues to exist.
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338 (effective January 1, 1980), the text of which is
reproduced at note*114. infra.
11. Property acquired by virtue of a voluntary partition was not classified as
separate property of a spouse under the following pertinent articles.
LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341 (effective January 1, 1980), the amended version of which
appears at note 115, infra.
The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property ac-
quired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime;
property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and com-
munity things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in com-
parison with the value of the separate things used; property acquired by a spouse
by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in an
action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as
a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community property by the
other spouse; and damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection
with the management of his separate property.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2342 (effective January 1, 1980):
A declaration in an act of acquisition that things are acquired with separate
funds as the separate property of a spouse may be controverted by the other
spouse unless he concurred in the act. It may also be controverted by the forced
heirs and the creditors of the spouses, despite the concurrence by the other spouse....
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343 (effective January 1, 1980):
The donation by a spouse to the other spouse of his undivided interest in a thing
forming part of the community transforms that interest into separate property of
the donee. Unless otherwise provided in the act of donation, an equal interest of
the donee is also transformed into separate property and the natural and civil
fruits of the thing, and minerals produced from or attributed to the property
given as well as bonuses, delay rentals, royalties and shut-in payments arising
from mineral leases, form part of the donee's separate property.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344 (effective January 1, 1980):
Damages due to personal injuries sustained during the existence of the com-
munity by a spouse are separate property.
Nevertheless, the portion of the damages attributable to expenses incurred by
the community as a result of the injury, or in compensation of the loss of com-
munity earnings, is community property. If the community regime is terminated
otherwise than by the death of the injured spouse, the portion of the damages at-
tributable to the loss of earnings that would have accrued after termination of the
community property regime is the separate property of the injured spouse.
[Vol. 42
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1980.1981
session. The amendment to article 2336 adds a new paragraph: "Dur-
ing the existence of the community property regime, the spouses
may, without court approval, voluntarily partition the community
property in whole or in part. In such a case, the things that each
spouse acquires are his separate property."'2 Likewise, article 2341
which contains an enumeration of property that is separate was
amended to add the following language: "things acquired by a
spouse as a result of a voluntary partition of the community during
the existence of a community property regime."'8 By these
legislative provisions spouses have the recognized capacity to parti-
tion voluntarily without court approval community property in
whole or in part with the result that each spouse's acquisitions are
his separate property. The significance of the statutory language
"without court approval" is the legislature's distinction between the
proper subject of an ordinary contract of the spouses and that of a
matrimonial agreement. Even without the language exempting the
voluntary partition from judicial approval, the partition of the whole
community would not necessarily terminate the legal regime." Prop-
erty acquired after the voluntary partition would continue to be sub-
ject to the system of principles and rules provided by the spouses"
or by law."8 Arguably, the language was unnecessary; therefore its
inclusion in article 2336 is capable of two possible explanations.
First, it may be considered merely as a clarification-a voluntary
partition is an ordinary contract, not a matrimonial agreement. Or,
the implication may be that without specific dispensation a contract
between the spouses which reclassifies property as separate or com-
munity is subject to the requirement of court approval, as it is a
matrimonial agreement."
Article 2336 does not specify any formal requirements for a
voluntary partition of the community. Thus, the general rules re-
gulating the formality and recordation requirements for conven-
tional obligations would apply. For example, a partition affecting
community immovable property would have to be in writing"8 and
recorded to affect third persons.' If the transaction designated a
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1).
13. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1).
14. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2328 (effective January 1, 1980).
15. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2328 & 2329 (effective January 1, 1980).
16. Chapter 2 of Title VI of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code (effective
January 1, 1980).
17. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (effective January 1, 1980).
18. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2275.
19. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2265 & 2266.
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partition by the spouses is in fact a partition, authentic form is not
required, as it is neither a donation" nor a matrimonial agreement.2
Forced heirs of either spouse adversely affected by the voluntary
partition would only have the relief of an action in declaration of
simulation.2 For, if the contract is a partition, it is not a donation
subject to an action in reduction if it exceeds the disposable
portion." Likewise, creditors have the protection of the action in
declaration of simulation or the revocatory action.2,
Transformation of Separate Property to Community Property
Despite the internal inconsistency of the comment," Civil Code
article 2343.1 is an entirely new provision.' Before the enactment of
article 2343.1, a spouse had to execute a matrimonial agreement in
order to convert separate property to community property.28 With-
out a matrimonial agreement, the donation by a spouse of an un-
divided one-half interest in his separate property to the other
spouse did not transform the property from the separate property
of the donor to community property. The only result the spouse
could accomplish by the donation was that each spouse would own
thereafter an undivided one-half interest as separate property." In
contrast to the matrimonial regimes law of Louisiana, some of the
other community property states permit husband and wife to
transform separate property to community"0 and community property
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1536.
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2331 (effective January 1, 1980).
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2239.
23. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1502.
24. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2239.
25. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1969-1994.
26. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343.1, comment (a), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1:
"This provision is new. It clarifies the law." The designated source of the article is
"New."
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343.1, comment (a), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1:
The transfer by a spouse to the other spouse of a thing forming part of his
separate property, with the stipulation that it shall be part of the community,
transforms the thing into community property. As to both movables and im-
movables, a transfer by onerous title must be made in writing and a transfer by
gratuitous title must be made by authentic act.
28. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2328, 2329, 2330 & 2330 comment (d) (effective
January 1, 1980).
29. The undivided one-half interest of the donor naturally retained its separate
character. The undivided one-half interest donated to the other spouse was classified
as the separate property of the donee. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341 (effective January 1,
1980, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1).
30. Arizona: see, e.g., Baldwin v. Baldwin, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791 (1937); Moser
v. Moser, 572 P.2d 446 (1977); Schock v. Schock, 11 Ariz. App. 53, (1969).
California: see CALIF. CIVIL CODE § 5103 (West 1970); Hotle v. Miller, 51 Cal. 2d 541,
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to separate property of one of the spouses"' without restriction.
Therefore, on recommendation of the Louisiana Law Institute a new
article was added to the matrimonial regimes legislation to permit a
spouse to convey to the other spouse a thing that forms part of the
transferor's separate property, with the stipulation that the thing
transferred shall become part of the community.
As described in the comments to Civil Code article 2343.1, "the
transferor conveys to the other spouse one-half of what he owns and
retains the other half as co-owner under the regime of acquets and
gains. ' 12 The transfer may be either gratuitous or onerous. In con-
trast, Civil Code article 2343 permits a transformation of community
property to separate property of a spouse only gratuitously.33
Whether the transformation is onerous or gratuitous, the transfer
must include the stipulation that it shall be part of the community.
Under article 2343.1, special rules of form apply to the transforma-
tion of separate property to community property. As to movable
property, if the transfer is onerous it must be in writing, which is a
departure from the general rules of conventional obligations;3' and if
the transfer of movable property is by gratuitous title, it must be
by authentic act, which as applied to corporeal movable property is
an exception to the general rule.35 If the transfer affects immovable
property, a transfer by onerous title must be in writing, and a
transfer by gratuitous title must be by authentic act.
334 P.2d 849 (1959); Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 30 P.2d 398 (1934): Frymire v.
Brown, 94 P.2d 334 (Cal. App. 3d Cir. 1949).
Texas: see Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 202, 220 S.W. 2d 637 (1949); Kellett v. Trice, 95
Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902); Coggin v. Coggin, 204 S.W. 2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
Washington: see, e.g., Volz v. Zang. 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920); In re Estate
of Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178 (1970).
31. Louisiana's equivalent provision is LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343 (effective January
1, 1980, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1), the text of which is reproduced at
note 6, supra.
32. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343.1, comment (b), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
33. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921, § 1). To convert community property to separate property, a spouse is
authorized only to transfer his undivided one-half interest gratuitously. Thus, article
2343 is consistent with the general article enumerating property that comprises a
spouse's separate property. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No.
921, § 1. Should a spouse dispose of his one-half interest in the community onerously to
the other spouse it would be community property, with one exception, under the
clause of article 2338: "all other property not classified by law as separate property."
However, if the spouse purchasing the undivided one-half interest of the other is able
to prove separate funds were used (LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341), the presumption that the
property is community is rebutted. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2340. In the latter case, the un-
divided one-half interest purchased is separate property but the remaining one-half in-
terest is community property.
34. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1762 & 1764.
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1539.
1982]
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The ability accorded to husband and wife to transform separate
property to community property is particularly significant in light of
the 1981 changes in successions law. For example, under Louisiana
Civil Code article 890,1 the surviving spouse shall have a legal
usufruct over the deceased spouse's one-half interest in the com-
munity undisposed of by testament and inherited by descendants. In
contrast to its predecessor, Louisiana Civil Code article 916,11 article
890 extends the legal usufruct of the surviving spouse "to all former
community property of the deceased regardless of whether the
descendants who succeed to the property are issue of the marriage
with the survivor or not."38 If non-issue of the marriage are the heirs
of the deceased, security may be requested by the naked owners
from the surviving spouse. 9 Of particular importance is the fact that
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 890, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, and shall not have disposed
by testament of his share in the community property, the surviving spouse shall
have a legal usufruct over so much of that share as may be inherited by the
descendants. This usufruct terminates when the surviving spouse contracts
another marriage, unless confirmed by testament for life or for a shorter period.
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter period
to the surviving spouse over so much of the separate property as may be in-
herited by issue of the marriage with the survivor or as may be inherited by il-
legitimate children.
A usufruct authorized by this article is to be treated as a legal usufuct and is
not an impingement upon legitime.
If the usufruct authorized by this article affects the rights of heirs other than
children of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse, or af-
fects separate property, security may be requested by the naked owner.
This article, under section 7 of 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1, shall apply "to the
rights and obligations of persons whose date of death is after December 31, 1981."
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 916:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left issue of the
marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by last will and testa-
ment, of his or her share in the community property, the survivor shall hold in
usufruct, during his or her natural life, so much of the share of the deceased in
such community property as may be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall
cease, however, whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage unless
the usufruct has been confirmed for life or any other designated period to the sur-
vivor by the last will and testament of the predeceased husband or wife, and the
rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which
usufruct shall not be an impingement upon the legitime. Further, a husband or
wife may, by his or her last will and testament, grant a usufruct for life or any
other designated period to the surviving spouse over so much of the separate
property as may be inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor, and the
rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which
usufruct thus granted shall be treated in the same fashion as a legal usufruct and
not be an impingement upon the legitime.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 890, comment (a), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1.
39. LA. Civ. CODE art. 890, comment (b), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, §
1. See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3154.1, added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 3.
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article 890 characterizes this usufruct as a legal usufruct, which is
not to be considered an impingement on the legitime of forced heirs.
Thus, by simply converting, onerously or gratuitously, separate
property to community property, a spouse is assured that the sur-
vivor will enjoy a usufruct over the deceased's share of the proper-
ty, regardless of who inherits it, and will not be subject to an action
in reduction by forced heirs." Should a spouse die without being sur-
vived by children, the surviving spouse succeeds to his share of the
community property"' in preference to the deceased's parents and
siblings. Yet, if the property left by the deceased is separate property,
father and mother, and brothers and sisters or their descendants
succeed to the separate property of the deceased, 2 in preference to
the surviving spouse.'3 . Without the necessity of executing a will, a
40. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 1502.
41. LA. CiV. CODE art. 889, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1: "If the
deceased spouse leaves no descendants, his surviving spouse succeeds to his share of
the community property." Cf. LA. CiV. CODE art. 915:
When either husband or wife shall die, leaving neither a father nor mother nor
legitimate descendants, and without having disposed by last will and testament of
his or her share of the community property, such undisposed of share shall be in-
herited by the surviving spouse in full ownership. In the event the deceased leave
legitimate descendants, his or her share in the community estate shall be in-
herited by such descendants in the manner provided by law.
Should the deceased leave no legitimate descendants, but a father and mother,
or either, then the share of the deceased in the community estate shall be divided
in two equal portions, one of which shall go to the father and mother or the sur-
vivor of them, and the other portion shall go to the surviving spouse, who,
together with the father or mother inheriting in the absence of legitimate descen-
dants, as provided above, shall inherit as legal heir by operation of law, and
without the necessity of compliance with the forms of law provided in this
Chapter' for the placing of irregular heirs in possession of the succession to which
they are called.
42. LA. Civ. CODE art. 891, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1:
If the deceased leaves no descendants but is survived by a father, mother, or
both and by a brother or sister, or both, or descendants from them, the brothers
and sisters or their descendants succeed to the separate property of the deceased
subject to a usufruct in favor of the surviving parent or parents. If both parents
survive the deceased, the usufruct shall be joint and successive. A parent, for pur-
poses of this and the following article, includes one who is legitimately filiated to
the deceased or who is filiated by legitimation or by acknowledgement under Art-
icle 203 or by judgment under Article 209 or who has openly and notoriously
treated the child as his own and has not refused to support him.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 892, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1:
If the deceased leaves neither descendants nor parents, his brothers or sisters
or descendants from them succeed to his separate property in full ownership to
the exclusion of other ascendants and other collaterals.
If the deceased leaves neither descendants nor brothers or sisters, nor descen-
dants from them, his parent or parents succeed to the separate property to the
exclusion of other ascendants and other collaterals.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 894, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1:
If the deceased leaves neither descendants, nor parents, nor brothers, sisters or
19821
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spouse by transformation of separate property to community may
prefer the surviving spouse over parents, brothers and sisters, and
be assured that the usufruct of his undivided one-half share shall ap-
ply to all descendants, whether issue or non-issue of the marriage,
and not be subject to an action in reduction.
JURISPRUDENCE***
Classification of Pensions
Although two Louisiana courts of appeal considered the
classification of a spouse's military retirement plan and reached con-
descendants from them, his spouse not judically separated from him shall succeed
to his separate property to the exclusion of other ascendants and other col-
laterals.
***The United States Supreme Court decision in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981) is not discussed in the text of this symposium, because
its major significance concerns retroactive application. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal held that Louisiana's "head and master" provision, LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404
(repealed January 1, 1980), was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 609 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.
1979). Despite ruling that Civil Code article 2404 was unconstitutional, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded, "We apply our decision today prospectively only, because a holding of
retroactive invalidity of Article 2404 would create a substantial hardship with respect
to property rights and obligations.... Since our decision could produce substantial in-
equitable results if applied retroactively, we avoid that 'injustice or hardship' through
a holding of nonretroactivity." 609 F.2d at 735-36.
In affirming the court of appeal decision the majority of the United States Supreme
Court refused to address the issue of retroactivity since it was not properly before the
Court: "We decline to address appellant's concerns about the potential impact of the
Court of Appeal's decision on other mortgages executed pursuant to Art. 2404. The only
question properly before us is whether the decision of the Court of Appeals applies to
the mortgage in this case, and in that issue we find no ambiguity." 450 U.S. at 462, 101
S. Ct. at 1200. The Supreme Court concluded that the mortgage executed by the hus-
band in 1974 was invalid. However, concurring Justices Rehnquist and Stewart did ad-
dress the issue of retroactivity: "While it is clear that the Court is correct that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals applied to the particular mortgage executed by Mr.
Feenstra, it is equally clear that the court's explicit announcement that its holding was
to apply only prospectively means that no other mortgage executed before the date of
the decision of the Court of Appeals is invalid by reason of its decision." 450 U.S. at
463, 101 S. Ct. at 1200 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Should the concurring Justices be correct, the date that the court of appeal decision
was rendered was December 12, 1979. The appropriate federal statute, 28 U.S.C. 2101
(1976), and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, No. 41 provide for a suspension
of the mandate issued to the district court when the losing party applies for a writ of
certiorari. There is no specific reference to a stay of the mandate (which issues twenty-
one days after entry of a notation of the judgment in the docket) when a losing party
appeals the judgment. Possibly, therefore, under the concurring opinion, sales, mort-
gages or leases executed by the husband alone, when the title to immovable property
stood in his name alone and was not declared to be the family home, were invalid from
December 12, 1979 to January 1, 1980. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2334 & 2404 (as they
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flicting results," the United States Supreme Court in McCarty v.
McCarty" held that the husband's army retirement pay was
separate property. The husband argued that the application of com-
munity property concepts to military retired pay conflicted with
federal law for two reasons: (1) military retired pay is not deferred
compensation for services performed during marriage, but is current
compensation for reduced but currently rendered services,' and (2)
the application of community property law "conflicts with the
federal military retirement scheme regardless of whether retired
pay is defined as current or as deferred compensation."" Deciding on
the basis of the husband's second argument, 8 the Court examined
the legislative history of the military retirement system and con-
cluded that the language and structure of the federal legislation"
demonstrated a Congressional intent that retired pay accrue directly
appeared prior to their repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1); LA.'R.S. 9:2801-2804 (as
they appeared prior to their repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1).
44. In DeDon v. DeDon, 390 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), writs granted, 396
So. 2d 919, aff'd, 404 So. 2d 904 (La. 1981), the court held that the husband's Air
Force retirement benefits were separate property, because the Federal Supremacy
Clause (article VI, clause 2. of the United States Constitution) barred the application of
Louisiana community property law. Earlier Louisiana decisions concluding that the
husband's military retirement pay was community property were analyzed in light of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979). See Moon v. Moon, 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Swope v. Mitchell,
324 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit Court of Appeal found that
"although Hisquierdo only dealt with the Railroad Retirement benefits, we are con-
vinced that military retirement benefits are in the same category and cannot be con-
sidered a part of the community." 390 So. 2d 937, 941 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
When the First Circuit Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of classification of
the husband's army retirement pay, the court held "that Congress has not 'positively
required by direct enactment' that Louisiana's community property laws be pre-
empted as to the nature of military retirements benefits." Rogers v. Rogers, 401 So. 2d
406, 409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). In summarizing, Judge Lottinger opined: "We
therefore reject the reasoning of the DeDon decision as well as the decisions from the
Alaska Supreme Court upon which DeDon relied. See Cose v. Cose, 592 F.2d 1230
(Alaska 1979)." 401 So. 2d at 409.
45. 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
46. 101 S. Ct. at 2736. Although the Court did conclude that it was unnecessary to
decide whether federal law prohibits a state from characterizing retired pay as de-
ferred compensation, it discussed the characterization as follows:
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the retired officer faces not only significant
restrictions upon his activities, but a real risk of recall. At the least, then, the
possibility that Congress intended military retired pay to be in part current com-
pensation for those risks and restrictions suggests that States must tread with
caution in this area, lest they disrupt the federal scheme.
101 S. Ct. at 2736 n.16.
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2736.
48. See note 46, supra.
49. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911-3929 (1976).
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to the retiree. Thus, since a conflict existed between the terms of
the federal retirement statutes and the community property rights
asserted by the wife, the issue was whether the application of com-
munity property principles to military retired pay threatened
"grave harm to 'clear and substantial' federal interests."'5 The pur-
poses Congress sought to achieve by enacting the military retire-
ment system were described as follows: ". . to provide for the
retired service member, and to meet the personnel management
needs of the active military forces."'" The "grave harm" to federal
interests was described in the following language: "Congress has
determined that a youthful military' is essential to the national
defense; it is not for states to interfere with that goal by lessening
the incentive to retire created by the military retirement system."5
Recognizing that the plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service
member is a serious one, the court observed that the decision to afford
the ex-spouse more protection is for Congress alone." Congressional
legislation introduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress to provide for a
pro rata distribution of retired pay to a former spouse and to
authorize compliance with the terms of a community property settle-
ment died in committee.5 Legislation was introduced again in the
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2741.
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2741. As to the first purpose underlying military retirement pay,
the Court opined that the community property interest the wife sought, "'promises to
dimish that portion of the benefit Congress has said should go to the retired Iservice
member] alone.' See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590." Secondly, the military retirement
system was designed "to serve as an inducement for enlistment and re-enlistment, to
create an orderly career path, and to ensure 'youthful and vigorous' military forces."
Recognition of the wife's community property interest in her husband's military
retired pay has the "potential for disruption of military personnel management .... "
Id
52. Id. (emphasis added). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Brennan and Stewart, concluded that the majority opinion's reliance on His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), was misplaced. 101 S. Ct. at 2742 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Under the rule enunciated in Hisquierdo, if state family law and
a federal statute come into conflict, state law is pre-empted only when Congress has
"positively required (it) by direct enactment." 439 U.S. at 581. According to Justice
Rehnquist, the majority's failure to analyze vigorously the federal statutes under the
Hisquierdo rule could only be explained as follows: "IThe Court cannot, even to its
satisfaction, plausibly maintain that Congress has 'positively required by direct enact-
ment' that California's community property law be pre-empted by the provisions
governing military retired pay." 101 S. Ct. at 2743 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. Congress has seen fit to afford "special protection" to the ex-spouse of a civil
servant and the ex-spouse of a member of the foreign service. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1)
(1976) (civil service); 22 U.S.C. § 1076 (1976) (foreign service).
54. H.R. 2817, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 6270, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See the discussion of these Congressional pro-
posals in McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2728, 2740 n.25.
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Ninety-seventh Congress that would require pro rata division of
military retired pay,5 but whether this legislative attempt to pro-
vide for the ex-spouse of a military member will be successful re-
mains to be seen. Although the Department of Defense did not op-
pose the legislation introduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress, "it did
express its concern over the dissimilar treatment offered service
members depending on whether or not they are stationed in com-
munity property states."" This particular concern could be solved,
of course, by legislation providing in all cases for the pro rata divi-
sion of military retired pay; yet this approach was described as
radical in committee reports on last year's Congressional
legislation. 7
Whether the wife of the retired military member will be entitled
to claim reimbursement for one-half of community funds used to ac-
quire separate property58 depends upon how the United States
Supreme Court characterizes the service member's benefits. If in
fact retired pay is considered by the Court as pay for reduced but
current services of the military spouse, 9 rather than deferred com-
pensation, the non-military spouse has no claim for reimbursement.
The retired pay is simply earnings accruing after termination of the
community, thus separate property. Under Civil Code article 2366,
no separate property of the husband was acquired during marriage
by the use of community property.
However, if retired pay is considered deferred compensation,
representing the product of the effort, skill, or industry of a spouse
during the community regime, the other spouse under matrimonial
regimes law is entitled to some compensation. In the analogous
situation where a spouse's interest in a state statutory retirement
plan has been classified as separate property, the other spouse at
least has been entitled to claim reimbursement for one-half the com-
munity funds used to acquire the interest.0 The difficulty military
retired pay presents is that the military retirement plan is described
by the Court as non-contributory: "neither the service member nor
55. H.R. 3039, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 888, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 3039 was introduced on April 6, 1981 and sent to the Armed Services Committee;
S. 888 was introducted April 7, 1981 and sent to the Finance Committee.
56. "See Hearing on H.R. 2817, H.R. 3677, and H.R. 6270 before the Military Com-
pensation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 55, 58, 63 (1980) (Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Tice)." 101 S. Ct. at
2740 n.26.
57. "See H.R. Rep. No. 96-992, pt. 1. pp. 70-71 (1980); S. Rep. No. 96-913, pp. 66-68
(1980i; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1432, p. 116 (1980)." 101 S. Ct. at 2739 n.24.
58. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2366 (effective January 1, 1980).
59. See discussion in text at notes 46-47, supra.
60. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed in text at notes 66-81, infra.
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the Federal Government makes periodic contributions to any fund ... ;
instead, retired pay is funded by annual appropriations."6' Yet, the
annual appropriations are periodic contributions and Congress' ap-
propriation of the funds can be identified as action of the federal
government, the employer. Despite the language utilized by the
United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty,62 the plan
could be characterized as an employer-contributory plan, the appro-
priations representing additional and deferred compensation. How-
ever, language in the majority opinion suggests that the Court does
not consider the annual appropriation as a periodic contribution.
The only alternative remedy available, if reimbursement is not,
would be an off-setting award recognizing that the pay is deferred
compensation, although classified as separate property of the
military member. In all probability, the United States Supreme
Court would reject such an alternative demand, as they did in His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo."3 Essentially, the off-setting award "would
upset the statutory balance and impair [pensioner's] economic security
just as surely as would a regular deduction from his benefit check."6
In addition to affecting the financial security of the pensioner, such
an off-setting award was found in Hisquierdo to frustrate federal
policy:
By barring lump-sum community property settlements based
on mere expectations, the prohibition against anticipation pre-
vents such a obvious frustration of Congressional purpose. It
also preserves congressional freedom to amend the Act, and so
serves much the same function as the frequently stated under-
standing that programs of this nature convey no future rights
and so may be changed without taking property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
The implication of such language is that any compensation awarded
to the non-member spouse, whether in the form of reimbursement or
an off-setting award, is prohibited by the Federal Supremacy
Clause: otherwise, the "grave harm" to "clear and substantial in-
terests" could be accomplished, indirectly, rather than directly.
While the United States Supreme Court was considering the
classification of military retired pay, Louisiana Courts of Appeal
were wrestling with classification of state statutory retirement
plans. In Kennedy v. Kennedy" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
61. McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2732.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 2732.
63. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
64. Id at 588.
65. Id. at 589-90.
66. 391 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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held that a husband's interest in the Firefighters' Pension and Relief
Fund, a state statutory retirement plan, 7 was separate property.
Yet, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Thrash v. Thrash" held
that the wife's interest in the Louisiana State Teachers' Retirement
System, also a state statutory plan, was community property to the
extent attributable to her employment during the existence of the
community.
Relying upon two earlier decisions of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal, Scott v. Scott 9 (State Teachers' Retirement System) and
Roberts v. Roberts"0 (Louisiana Employees' Retirement System), the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that the legislature in-
tended that the pension rights of the husband in a state statutory
retirement plan be separate property because (1) membership in the
plan was restricted to a specific type of employment, and (2) rights of
members in the plan are "exempted from judicial process, are
unassignable, and not subject to any other process ... ""
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Thrash concluded that
"[h]owever appropriate the analogy employed in Scott v. Scott,
supra, we do not follow that line of jurisprudence in the instant suit
as recent Supreme Court decisions mandate a different approach in
the determination of the community's interest in deferred compensa-
tion plans.""2 The Louisiana Supreme Court cases to which the court
referred were T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery" and Sims v.
67. LA. R.S. 33:2101 (1950 & Supp. 1969 & 1980), as amended by 1980 La. Acts,
No. 228, § 1.
68. 387 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 745 (La. 1980).
69. 179 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
71. 391 So. 2d at 1197. See LA. R.S. 33:2120 (1950 & Supp. 1969 & 1977), as amend-
ed by 1977 La. Acts, No. 640, § 1. However, since payments were made by the hus-
band to the pension plan with community funds, the court held that he was indebted to
the community for the contributions made during the community regime. LA. CiV.
CODE art. 2408 (repealed January 1, 1980). In addition, the court opined that the non-
member spouse is entitled to one-half the value of the increase of the husband's
separate property:
The non-member spouse is entitled to reimbursement for contributions made to
the fund from the community, plus reimbursement for any increase in value, in-
cluding interest or contributions that may come from other sources, e.g., the
employer. The community's equity in the pension fund should be reimbursable
now as an offset in the pending partition.
391 So. 2d at 1198.
72. 387 So. 2d at 24.
73. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976). The court cited at length from T.L. James & Co. v.
Montgomery and offered an explanation for a footnote appearing in the Louisiana
Supreme Court opinion in T.L. James, that the decisions holding the teachers' retire-
ment benefits as separate property were inapplicable to the issue presented in the
case:
We do not view the language in the above footnote as a comment by the court
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Sims." In particular the third circuit relied on the rationale of Sims
v. Sims which held that the husband's rights in a federal statutory
retirement plan were community property to the extent attributable
to his employment during marriage. According to the majority of
the third circuit, by concluding that the husband's federal statutory
plan was community property, "the Supreme Court rejected the
reasoning which formed the basis of the Scott deision."7 5 The Loui-
siana Supreme Court in the Sims case, relying on Moon v. Moon"8
and Swope v. Mitchell," involving the husband's rights in a military
pension plan, stated that the exemption provisions in federal
statutory plans do not preclude the classification of federal retire-
ment rights as community property. Therefore, the third circuit,
following this reasoning, concluded that it is likewise true that a
state exemption statute, ie., one forbidding the execution-sale and
limiting the assignability of retirement plan proceeds, such as Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 17:573, supra, does not preclude the
classification of state retirement rights as community property."8 To
the extent that the decision in Thrash was based on Moon, Swope
and Sims, however, it arguably has been overruled by the United
States Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty."9 Yet, in ad-
dition to the rationale of Sims, the third circuit correctly observed
that the exemption provisions which often appear in state and
federal statutory plans "are not dispositive of ownership as they
serve no classificatory function."'" Such a conclusion is reminiscent
of the dissent by Judge Marvin in Roberts v. Roberts,' which is
cited in Thrash.
The majority of state court decisions, with only one exception,
reach the same result as the United States Supreme Court did con-
cerning the classification of a spouse's interest in a statutory plan.
Thus, a spouse may reason that government employment has bene-
on the correctness of the Scott line of cases. Nor do we find said footnote as con-
trolling as (1) there was no question before the court in Montgomery concerning
teacher retirement benefits; (2) the parenthetical comment within the footnote has
dubious meaning as there is no "special legislation" which specifically provides
that "benefits under the teacher's retirement system are the separate property of
the teacher-spouse"; and (3) finally, any doubt that the language of said footnote
might have cast on our decision today has been dispelled by the Sims decision.
387 So. 2d at 25.
74. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
75. Thrash v. Thrash, 387 So. 2d 21, 25 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
76. 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
77. 324 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 19751.
78. 387 So. 2d at 25.
79. See text at notes 45-52, supra.
80. 387 So. 2d at 25.
81. 325 So. 2d at 680-81, cited in Thrash v. Thrash, 387 So. 2d at 21 n.2.
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fits and advantages over private industry"2 not ordinarily extolled. A
spouse employed by the state or federal government is accumulating
rights in a retirement plan, an asset of significant value, that will be
separate property should the marriage terminate. Furthermore, if
the federal government is the employer and the retirement system
is created by statute, the non-employee spouse cannot claim compen-
sation through off-setting awards, or reimbursement. One many
ponder whether there is a justification for the difference in treat-
ment of the pension plans of private industry as compared to the
statutory retirement plans of the government.
Credit Purchases of Immovable Property During the Community
Regime
Purchases of immovable property by the wife during the ex-
istence of a community regime were presumed to be community
property under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2402" and 2405.4
82. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976), is an example.
Furthermore, some cases have held that a private plan regulated by ERISA, a federal
statute, are not governed'by the same rules on classification of a spouse's interest, as
retirement systems created by federal statute. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs Pension
Trust v. Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 951 (1980); Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d
113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979). appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); Retirement Fund
Trust of the Plumbing Heating & Piping Ind. of S. Cal. v. Johns, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511,
149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
But see Kuchta v. Kuchta 50 U.S.L.W. 2165 (Mo. Sup. Ct.. Aug. 8, 1981). A private
retirement plan, which provides pension benefits, is subject to divestiture on con-
tingencies; therefore, it is not marital property subject to equitable division. Further-
more, the same concerns which prompted the United States Supreme Court in McCarty
v. McCarty to hold that a federal statutory plan is the separate property of the
member spouse, are valid in the property of the private market place. Retirement
plans in the private market also fulfill the same purposes, enumerated in the McCarty
case, as a military retirement plan.
83. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1:
This partnership or community consists of the profits* of all of the effects of
which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in
fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife,
and of the estate which they may acquire during the marriage, either by dona-
tions made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar way, even
although the purchase be only in the name of one of the two and not of both,
because in that case the period of time when the purchase is made is alone attended
to, and not the person who made the purchase. But damages resulting from per-
sonal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this community, but shall always
be and remain the separate property of the wife and recoverable by herself alone;
"provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in her death, the right
to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing laws."
* Note error in translation of French text; "profits" should be "fruits."
84. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2405 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1):
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Under those two articles as interpreted by the jurisprudence, an ac-
quisition of property by either spouse during the existence of the
community of acquets and gains was presumed to be community
property. However, the burden of proof imposed upon the wife to
rebut the presumption that the property was community was
significantly different from that imposed upon the husband.85 The
wife was required to prove that (1) the property was purchased
with her separate funds, (2) under her separate control and ad-
ministration, (3) for the benefit of her separate estate, and (4) if a
credit purchase, that she had sufficient separate funds at the time of
the purchase so as it would be reasonable to expect her to meet the
deferred payments.86 If the husband concurred in the act of acquisi-
tion executed by the wife in which she declared that she was pur-
chasing with her separate property for the benefit of her separate
estate, the husband was thereafter estopped to deny that the prop-
erty was in fact separate property.87
At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, all effects which both husband
and wife reciprocally possess, are presumed common effects or gains, unless it be
satisfactorily proved which of such effects they brought in marriage, or which
have been given them separately, or which they have respectively inherited.
85. The husband was required to insert in the act of acquisition by which im-
movable property was purchased ("or in any other similar way," LA. CiV. CODE art.
2402 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1)), a "double
declaration to the effect that the property purchased was paid for with separate funds
for the benefit of his separate estate." See, e.g., Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d
648 (1948); Phillips v. Nereux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), and cases cited
therein. Absent the "double declaration" by the husband in the act of acquisition, the
property was conclusively presumed to be community property; thus, the failure of the
husband to include "the declaration" became a rule of classification of property, rather
than a rule of evidence. See Samuels, Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's Equal
Management Law: Interpretation and Constitutionality. 39 LA. L. REV. 347. 398-400
(1978). If the husband did insert the "double declaration" in the act of sale, he was not
relieved of the burden of proving that the property was in fact acquired with separate
funds for the benefit of his separate estate. The "double declaration" requirement im-
posed upon the husband has been legislatively overruled by Civil Code article 2340 (ef-
fective January 1, 1980). See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2340, comment (b).
86. See, e.g., Betz v. Riviere. 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947); Minden Chamber of
Commerce v. Goodman, 243 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Succession of Winsey,
170 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
87. McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So. 2d 883, 887-88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), writ
refused. 216 La. 861, 257 So. 2d 434 (1972):
The husband is estopped to deny the paraphernal nature of the property where
the deed of acquisition recites the property is purchased by the wife for her
separate estate, with separate funds under her own administration and control,
and the husband executes the instrument acknowledging these facts to be true.
Succession of Bar, 219 So. 2d 817 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
See also A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 130 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 344-345
& n.177 (2d ed. 1980).
[Vol. 42
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1980-1981
Last year the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that if a
wife bought a $60,000 house with only $28,500 of her separate funds,
intending to pay the credit balance with community funds and
monetary inflation made the house worth $150,000, then the fair
treatment "is to hold it owned 28,500/60,000 (or 47.5%) by the wife's
separate estate and 31,500/60,000 (or 52.5%) by the community."88
Although the husband had acknowledged in -the act of purchase that
the house was being bought with the wife's separate funds and was
her separate propety, Judge Redmann concluded he was not there-
after estopped to deny that the credit portion was in fact paid for
with separate funds. According to Judge Redmann, estoppel by deed
"applies only to existent facts that are recited in the deed, and not
to future factual expectations or to matters of legal interpretation.
(Indeed, one may question whether a spouse ever is estopped by a
recital of separateness-a conclusion at least partly of law rather
than purely of fact.)"89 The reasons cited for failing to apply the
presumption that the property acquired was community was "severe
inflation."" Since the husband was estopped to deny that the down
payment had been made with the wife's separate property (which
she could prove), it was as if the wife bought an undivided interest
in the piece of immovable property for her separate estate, with the
other undivided interest being purchased for the community. 1
88. Curtis v. Curtis, 388 So. 2d 816, 817 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 395 So.
2d 339 (1980). rev'd, 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981).
89. 388 So. 2d at 818.
90. Notwithstanding that Jordy v. Muir, 1898, 51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550, lend
superficial support to a conclusion that the house in our case is treatable as 100%
community. Jordy did not face the problem of severe inflation: there a house
bought for $2500 sold for $2300 net .... Jordy is thus but an example of this opin-
ion's first premise: it makes no economic difference which estate owns the prop-
erty subject to a debt owed to the other, if the property's value is constant. Jordy
does not answer our question. We have had to provide our own answer, and we
have done so as fairly as we can.
Id. at 819.
91.' Finally, we note that undivided interests can be purchased by a community or
spouse: a husband who was "head and master" could have expressly purchased a
47.5% undivided interest in a house for his separate estate, with the other 52.5%
being purchased for the community. The wife should not be denied the same
power to buy an undivided interest when the husband by signing her act of pur-
chase agreed that she was (at leastl) to that extent purchasing for her separate
estate, and agreed that the credit portion of the price was to be paid with the
rentals which by law belonged to the community. Certainly it was the wife's ex-
pressed intent to make an investment for her separate estate, and it was only her
lack of funds that prevented her purchasing the entire property for her separate
estate.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court, on writ of certiorari, reversed
the court of appeal. 2 The supreme court held that the property pur-
chased by the wife was her separate property and that the declara-
tions in the act of sale "served to reserve the fruits of her separate
property for her separate use.""3 Therefore, the wife was not
obligated to reimburse the community for the use of the rentals to
pay the credit portion of the purchase price. The rationale that the
Louisiana Supreme Court utilized to reach the foregoing conclusions
is important not only for purposes of interpretation of the old
matrimonial regimes law but also for purposes of the interpretation
of the matrimonial regimes law effective January 1, 1980.
First, the Louisiana Supreme Court opined, "while other com-
munity property states may categorize property paid for in part
with separate funds and in part with community funds as mixed,
Louisiana does not do so."9' According to the supreme court, under
Louisiana law property is either community or separate. Such a con-
clusion is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article 2335 which
declares that "[piroperty of married persons is either community or
separate." However, despite Civil Code article 2335, the juris-
prudence has recognized that certain property may be owned pro-
portionately by the community and the separate estate of a
spouse-such as interests in retirement plans,95 contingent fee con-
tracts,9 and personal injury recoveries. 7 Limited to its facts,
however, the supreme court decided that immovable property pur-
chased on credit will not be owned proportionately by the separate
estate of a spouse and the community as a "mixed acquisition.""
92. 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981).
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id. at 57-58.
95. See, e.g., cases cited in note 82, supra.
96. Dud v. Dud, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977). The narrow issue presented was
whether the husband was obligated to respond to interrogatories propounded by his
ex-wife about his contingent fee contracts with clients executed during the existence of
the legal regime. See also Note, Classification of Incorporeal Movables, 42 LA. L. REv.
744.
97. See, e.g., West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975); Chambers v. Chambers,
259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971). As to personal injury recoveries, the matrimonial
regimes legislation specifically recognized that the separate estate of a spouse and
"the community" may have an interest in damages received for a'spouse's personal in-
jury (ie., for lost earnings), thus constituting a legislative exception to Civil Code article
2335.
See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344 (effective January 1, 1980), the text of which is
reproduced at note 11, supra.
98. See the description of problems for other community property states which
recognize proportionate ownership of immovable property in Cross, Community Pro-
erty: A Comparison of the System in Washington and Louisiana, 39 LA. L. REV. 479,
485 (1979); Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property versus Restitution from
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Secondly, since the property was purchased by the wife during
the existence of a community regime, it was presumed to be com-
munity property under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2402 and 2405.
The presumption is rebuttable, according to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, if the wife proves that she used separate funds for the pur-
chase and that the funds were administered by her alone and were
available for investment." However, the prior jurisprudential re-
quirement that the wife purchasing on credit prove "that the cash
portion of the purchase price bore such a relation to the total price
that the property afforded sufficient security for the credit portion,
and that she had sufficient separate revenues to be reasonably cer-
tain of being able to meet the deferred payments'"" is no longer
justified. In speaking for the majority Justice Dixon opined:
We believe that a married woman is entitled to purchase prop-
erty on credit as an investment, and to avail herself of the same
credit devices her husband can use. We do not believe that she
should have to prove that she can use credit more wisely than
he. If she later used community funds to pay her separate debt
she is obligated to reimburse the community for that amount.,01
Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 427 (1952), cited in footnote 2 of
the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981).
The California Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict in three California
Courts of Appeal decisions concerning the characterization of a residence (immovable
property) purchased during the parties' marriage with both separate and community
funds. In Lucas v. Lucas, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980), the California
Supreme Court approved of the approach utilized in In re Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d
533, 156 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1979), which held that a residence purchased during marriage
with separate and community funds was entirely community property in the absence
of any evidence of an agreement or understanding between the parties to the contrary.
According to the California Supreme Court, the act of taking title in joint ownership is
inconsistent with the intention to preserve a separate property interest. The Supreme
Court rejected a scheme for pro-rata apportionment of the equity appreciation bet-
ween separate and community contributions to the purchase price, a result reached by
one California court of appeal in In re Aufinuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 466, 152 Cal. Rpt. 668
(1979).
99. See, e.g., Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1953): Houghton v.
Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933); Succession of Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So. 391 (1902):
Minden Chamber of Commerce v. Goodman, 243 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971);
Succession of Winsey, 170 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
100. 403 So. 2d 56, 58 (La. 1981).
101. Id. at 58.59.
It may have been logical for courts then to assume that the wife who received a
particular donation, or inheritance, and used it to purchase property on credit
terms would in fact have to use community funds for subsequent payments, in the
absence of a continuing source of income. Today, however, with an ever increas-
ing number of women entering the work force, such restrictions are no longer
supportable. Just as our legislature has amended the matrimonial regimes section
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Therefore, the majority of the supreme court in Curtis v. Curtis im-
posed a triple burden of proof upon the wife to rebut the presump-
tion that the property she acquired was community. She had to prove
that she used separate funds for the purchase, which she did suc-
cessfully. She had to prove that the funds were administered by her
alone, which she did in the following manner: (1) by proof in inter-
rogatories that she had in fact sold two pieces of separate property
and used that money for the downpayment, and (2) by the declara-
tion of her intent to administer her separate funds alone in the act
of acquisition in substantial compliance with Louisiana Civil Code ar-
ticle 2386."02 She had to prove she had sufficient funds available for
investment, proof of this fact presumably being made by the wife's
response to interrogatories concerning other pieces of separate
property that she owned and administered. The judicially imposed
"triple burden" of proof required of the wife to rebut the presump-
tion that property acquired is community has implications for the in-
terpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2340."
Under article 2340 property possessed by either spouse during
the existence of the legal regime is presumed community, "but
either spouse may prove that they [things] are separate property."
The implication of the quoted language is that "the double declara-
tion" requirement imposed upon the husband by prior juris-
prudence"' has been legislatively overruled." 5 The burden of proof
of our Civil Code to reflect modern economic and social realities, so are we impell-
ed to eliminate these restrictions and to recognize that rules which produce a just
result under certain circumstances may not do so when conditions change.
102. See text at notes 120-124, infra. LA. Civ. CoDE. art. 2386 (as it appeared prior
to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1):
The fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever the property be
located and however administered, whether natural, civil, including interest,
dividends and rents, or from the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership,
if there exists a community of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by written in-
strument, shall declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate
use and benefit and her intention to administer such property separately and
alone. The said instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and two
witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of the Parish where the
community is domiciled.
If there is no community of gains, each party enjoys, as he chooses, that which
comes to his hand; but the fruits and revenues which are existing at the dissolu-
tion of the marriage, belong to the owner of the things which produce them.
103. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2340 (effective January 1, 1980):
Things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of com-
munity of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse
may prove that they are separate property.
104. See cases cited in note 85, supra.
105. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2340, comment (b) (effective January 1, 1980): "This provi-
sion suppresses the requirement of a double declaration established by Louisiana
jurisprudence."
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which a spouse must bear to rebut the presumption of article 2340 is
not directly addressed by the legislation. Should the spouse be re-
quired to prove the elements required of the husband when he had
the "double declaration" in his act of acquisition or "the triple
burden" imposed under Curtis v. Curtis? The "triple burden of proof"
differs from that required of the husband who included the "double
declaration" in only one respect-the wife was required to prove the
separate funds were administered solely by her. In light of the
statutory changes in Civil Code article 2339,"6 which provides that
the natural and civil fruits of separate property can be reserved as
separate, the second element of proof of the "triple burden" should
no longer be imposed. At the time of the facts in Curtis v. Curtis,
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2386 the wife who wished to
reserve the income from her separate property as separate had to
declare that she was doing so and further declare her intention to
administer the property separately and alone. The latter declaration
was necessary to overcome the presumption that the husband ad-
ministered her separate property under Louisiana Civil Code article
2385.' Requiring the wife to prove her separate administration was
a partial assurance that the wife had a source of sufficient separate
funds to pay the purchase price; for otherwise, the income of her
separate property was community. Since neither husband nor wife
need declare their intention to administer separate property alone
under article 2339, proof of sole administration of separate property
should not be required to rebut the presumption of Civil Code arti-
cle 2340. Properly interpreted, Civil Code article 2340 requires that
a spouse prove that he used his separate funds to acquire property
for the benefit of his separate estate. Proof of the two elements
above should be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the prop-
erty acquired is community.
The effect of the declaration by the wife in the act of purchase
that she was acquiring with separate funds for the benefit of her
separate estate, acknowledged by the husband, was to classify the
106. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2339 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by 1980 La.
Acts, No. 565, § 2):
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals pro-
duced from or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals,
royalties and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases are community property.
Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as his separate property by a declara-
tion made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly
acknowledged....
(Emphasis added).
107. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2385 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1): "The paraphernal property, which is not administered by the wife
separately and alone, is considered to be under the management of the husband."
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property as separate property. The Louisiana Supreme Court
observed, "fojur jurisprudence has long held that a husband who has
been a party to an act of purchase in which such declarations are
made cannot afterwards be heard to contradict it."'05 According to
the supreme court, the principle of "estoppel by deed" recognized by
Louisiana jurisprudence applies to property purchased by the wife
"even if it was bought on credit.""' The supreme-court departed
from the court of appeal's interpretation that "estoppel by deed" on-
ly applied to presently existing facts, not future expectations. The
Louisiana Supreme Court observed that the legislature had codified
this principle in Louisiana Civil Code article 2342."' Thus, under
Curtis v. Curtis the first sentence of article 2342 will apply to credit
sales, as well as cash sales. A spouse under the provisions of article
2342 may not controvert a declaration that property is acquired
with separate funds for the benefit of the other spouse's separate
estate if he concurred in the act. If there is such a declaration, con-
curred in by the other spouse, the property is separate property as
between the spouses-a rule of classification.
Related to the character of the funds used to pay the credit por-
tion is the issue of whether the subsequent use of community funds
changes the character of an asset declared to be separate at acquisi-
tion. According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, property declared
to be separate at acquisition cannot be converted to community
property by the use of community funds to make subsequent credit
payments. Only when community and separate funds "are mingled in
the initial acquisition may the property be regarded as
community.""' During the discussion of the issue of "shifting"
classification of property the following statement was made: "[use of
community funds to make subsequent credit payments] would not
convert the property or any portion of it to community property.""'
However, this statement was qualified by the following footnote:
108. 403 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. 1981). The court cited a authority for this proposition
Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43. 29 So. 2d 465 (1947); Rousseau v. Rousseau, 209 La. 428, 24
So. 2d 676 (1946); Pfister v. Casso, 161 La. 940, 109 So. 770 (1926); Maguire v. Maguire,
40 La. Ann. 579, 4 So. 492 (1888); Kerwin v. Hibernia Insurance Co., 35 La. Ann. 33
(1883).
109. Id. at 59.
110. Id. at 59.
Our legislature has seen fit to recognize the wisdom of this judicial principle by
codifying it as new C.C. 2342 (effective January 1, 1980): "A declaration in an act
of acquisition that things are acquired with separate funds as separate property
of a spouse may be controverted by the other spouse unless he concurred in the
act .. "
111. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 59.
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"Under new Civil Code articles 2338 and 2341, which do not apply to
this case, property purchased with both separate and community
funds would appear to be community property unless the amount of
community funds used is inconsequential in comparison with the
amount of separate funds used.'.. The footnote does not indicate
whether the transaction contemplated involved commingling of
funds at the time of the initial acquisition. Therefore, the implication
may be that under the new matrimonial regimes legislation a dif-
ferent result may obtain-that is, that separate property may
"shift" in classification from separate to community. If a property's
character established at the moment of acquisition"' may be con-
verted by the use of community funds to pay any credit balance, " '
prior rules regarding the classification of insurance contracts,"' pen-
sions and profit-sharing plans, and credit purchases of immovable
property"7 have been changed."8 Presumably, such a result was not
the intention of the legislature. The only evidence available of the
legislature's intention is in a comment to Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cle 2341: "The value of the community things at the time of acquisi-
tion should be used for determining whether it is 'inconsequential' in
comparison with the value of the separate things used.""' The
113. Id. at 59 n.4.
114. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (effective January 1. 1980):
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of
the legal regime through the' effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property
acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless
classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the
spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded
for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property
not classified by lawas separate property.
115. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2341 (effective January 1, 1980, as amended by La. Acts
1981, No. 921. § 1):
The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property ac-
quired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime;
property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and com-
munity things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in com-
parison with the value of the separate things used; property acquired by a spouse
by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in an
action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as
a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community property by the
other spouse; damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection with
the management of his separate property; and things acquired by a spouse as a
result of a voluntary partition of the community during the existence of a com-
munity property regime.
116. See, e.g., Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
117. See cases cited in note 108, supra.
118. See Note. Clauification of Incorporeal Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 744.
119. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2341. comment (b), (effective January 1, 1980, as amended
by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1) (emphasis added).
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language "at the time of acquisition" suggests the same interpreta-
tion as that of Chief Justice Dixon in the Curtis case; that is, only
when community and separate funds are commingled in the initial
act of acquisition may the property be .regarded as community.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that community
funds were used to pay the credit portion of the purchase price,
because payments had been made with the rental income from the
property.' Since the wife had failed to record the notarial declara-
tion reserving "all" of the fruits of her separate property as
separate,'' the rental income was community property. In reversing
the decision of the court of appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that "the declarations made and signed by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis
are in substantial compliance with the requirements of Civil Code
article 2386 to reserve the fruits (rentals) of her separate property
to her separate estate." 2 It was unnecessary for the wife to have
filed a "separate" authentic act reserving the income as separate,
since Civil Code article 2386 "does not specify that the declarations
must be made in a separate document."'2 3 According to the supreme
120. According to the court,
[Ilt was always the intention of both wife and husband that funds the law
declares community funds (rental income from the house, because the wife has not
recorded the notarial declaration of reservation to her separate estate of "all" of
the fruits of her separate property. . .. ) would pay the balance of the price, by
monthly payments during the next 15 years.
388 So. 2d at 817-18.
121. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2386 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 1). The word "all" of the fruits of her separate property was emphasized by
the court of appeal in footnote one of the opinion in Curtis, 388 So. 2d 816, 817-18. This
purposeful emphasis is of some significance in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision that the declaration in the wife's acquisition was sufficient to categorize the
rental income produced as separate property under Civil Code article 2386. See text at
notes 122-23, infra.
The possible unconstitutionality of article 2386 was alluded to in the court of appeal
decision, 388 So. 2d 816, 817-818 & n.1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), and in the dissenting
opinion by Justice Calogero in the supreme court decision, 403 So. 2d at 61 (Calogero,
J., dissenting).
122. 403 So. 2d at 60. Paraphrasing the declarations made by the husband in the of-
fer to purchase and the act of sale, the Louisiana Supreme Court summarzied as
follows:
Mr. Curtis intervened in both the purchase offer and the act of sale, declaring
that the property was his wife's separate and paraphernal property, purchased
with separate and paraphernal funds under her administration and control and
that the community which existed between them had no interest whatsoever in
the property and that all payments and installments due on the property would
be paid by his wife with separate funds under her separate administration and
control.
Id. at 57.
123. Id. at 60.
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court, "[tihe joint declaration by the parties that all credit payments
on the property will be paid with Mrs. Curtis' separate funds, under
her administration and control, is sufficient to protect all the rents
from which the credit portion was to be paid from falling into the
'conjugal partnership.'""2" In a dissenting opinion, Justice Calogero
opined that the wife had failed to comply with the provisions of article
2386 for the following reasons: (1) she had made no declaration, only
the husband had (she simply signed the act of sale) and (2) the
declaration did not state specifically that the fruits of the property
were being reserved or that she intended to administer the piece of
property separately and -alone.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2339 requires that a spouse who
desires to reserve the natural and civil fruits and other income from
separate property as separate execute an authentic act or act under
private signature. Reserving the administration of a spouse's
separate property is unnecessary under article 2339. With this one
exception, if article 2339 otherwise is interpreted as its predecessor,
article 2386, was in Curtis, several questions are raised. If the
declaration such as that in Curtis is contained in an act of acquisi-
tion of immovable property, does it have general application, classi-
fying all income from separate property as separate? To
demonstrate, if income from other separate property had been used
to pay the credit portion, would the payments have been considered
separate property? Likewise, had the rental income been used for a
purpose other than the payment of the credit portion of the price
would it still have been classified as separate property? From a
careful reading of the majority and dissenting opinions, the separate
characterization of the income produced from the property was
dependent upon its being rental income from the specific piece of
immovable property and actually having been used for the purpose
of paying the balance due on the purchase price. If so, it could be in-
cumbent upon the spouse relying upon such a declaration to prove
the property produced rental income and that these rents were the
identical funds used to pay the credit portion of the price. Should
the spouse fail to prove both elements, the payments would be
presumed to have been made with community funds, thus imposing
an obligation on the spouse whose separate property was benefitted
to reimburse the other spouse.""
124. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
125. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2366 (effective January 1, 1980).
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